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1. Introduction  
 
Understanding the cyclicality of government expenditure is relevant from a policy making 
perspective. Expenditure patterns may change due to policy makers’ discretionary actions or as a 
result of the operation of automatic stabilizers (Granado et al., 2013). Government’s social 
spending policy has a stabilizing effect on the economy if one of its categories (e.g. spending on 
social protection or health) increases when output growth increases and falls when output growth 
declines (Furceri, 2010). The more countercyclical government social spending is, the higher its 
stabilizing effect—a relatively high level of government social spending when private demand is 
low will stabilize aggregate demand. Most of the empirical studies looking at the cyclical 
properties of government expenditure (and its components) typically uncover i) an acyclical or 
countercyclical behaviour for advanced countries (see e.g. Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002) and ii) a 
procyclical pattern for developing ones (Gavin et al., 1996; Kaminsky et al., 2005; Alesina and 
Tabellini, 2005). A number of explanations have been put forward to justify the different cyclical 
patterns in different groups of countries (see section 2 for more details).  
Focusing on government spending, the contrast between the two groups of countries can 
be clearly seen in Figure 1, which updates evidence presented in Kaminsky et al. (2004) and 
Frankel et al. (2013). The figure depicts the correlation between (the cyclical components of) 
government spending and GDP for 196 countries for the period 1960-2014. Blue bars represent 
advanced economies while orange bars represent developing ones. A positive (negative) 
correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) government spending. The majority of 





Figure 1. Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government 
expenditure and real GDP, 1960–2014 
 
Notes: Dark bars are advanced economies and light ones are developing ones. The cyclical components have been 
estimated using the Hodrick–Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) 
fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by 
the GDP deflator. Data from IMF’s WEO and IFS. 
 
Most empirical studies on this topic can be split in two: i) those that document the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policy and/or its components; ii) and those that inspect their determinants 
(typically using cross-country regressions on large datasets). The overwhelming share of papers 
has focused, for reasons related to data availability and quality, to analyses of European or OECD 
countries more generally. In this paper we ask two main questions. First, how stabilizing is de 
facto government’s social policy in developing countries and how has its cyclicality varied over 
time, between countries and around business cycles’ turning points? Second, which 
macroeconomic, financial, institutional and political variables determine the degree of cyclicality 
of government’s social spending in developing countries?  
We try to answer these two questions using a novel empirical strategy and estimating time-
varying measures of different categories of social spending cyclicality for an unbalanced panel of 
45 emerging and low-income countries from 1982 to 2012.1 To the best of our knowledge, this is 
                                                          
1 The selection of countries was based on the criteria of having at least 20 continuous time-series observations for a 
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the first paper that estimates time-varying measures of different categories of social spending 
cyclicality for a large set of developing economies. In addition, we examine which are the most 
relevant determinants of the time-varying measures of social spending cyclicality. The use of time-
varying measures of social spending cyclicality overcomes the major limitation of previous studies 
assessing the drivers of fiscal cyclicality that rely on cross-country regressions and therefore are 
not able to account for country-specific as well as global factors. 
The key findings of the paper are as follows. First, social spending has generally been 
acyclical over time in developing countries, with the exception of spending on pensions. However, 
sample averages high marked heterogeneity across countries with the majority showing procyclical 
behaviour in different social spending categories. In addition, we find that the degree of social 
spending [pro]cyclicality is generally negatively associated with financial deepening, the level of 
economic development, trade openness, government size as well as political constraints on the 
executive. These results depend on some structural characteristics of a given economy such as its 
indebtedness level, the stage of development of financial markets and the quality of its institutions.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
outlines the empirical methodology and discusses the data used. Section 4 presents some key 
stylized facts and discusses the main empirical results. The last section concludes. 
2. Literature Review  
 
 Most discussions on the cyclicality patterns of fiscal policy in general are centred around two 
main theories linking it to business cycle fluctuations: the Keynesian approach and the 
Neoclassical tax-smoothing model (Barro, 1979). The Keynesians posit that governments should 
spend and tax countercyclically, i.e., boosting demand through increased spending or lower taxes 
during a recession and doing the opposite during booms (Prasad and Gerecke, 2010). In contrast, 
Barro’s tax-smoothing model recommends acyclical fiscal policy that helps keep government 
expenditure and tax rates constant regardless of output fluctuations. 
 As far as expenditure policy is concerned, in order to stabilize the economy, governments 
should increase public spending during an economic downturn and vice versa. This would be a 
desirable feature from a fiscal stabilization perspective - and indeed a characteristics present is 
advanced economies (Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Staehr, 2008; Egert, 2012). However, Gavin, 
Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996)2 called the attention to the fact that the reality in many 
developing countries was of procyclicality in the conduct of expenditure policy (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008; Diallo, 2009; Abdih et 
al., 2010). In other words, we observe in developing countries spending indicators comoving 
positively with the business cycle, a behaviour that reinforces cycles and exacerbates booms and 
aggravates busts. This procyclical patterns was particularly evident in periods of financial distress 
                                                          
2 These authors were the first to notice the procyclical phenomenon in Latin American countries that differed 
substantially from that in the OECD countries and did not conform with either Keynesian or Barro prescriptions. 
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(Real and Vicente, 2008; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012). 3 Recently, Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin (2013) 
showed that over the last decade about one third of the developing world could escape the 
procyclicality trap and engage in countercyclical fiscal policy. 
 Now, an important component of countercyclical fiscal policy is countercyclical social policy, 
which includes unemployment benefits and other social transfers, expenditure on health, education 
and social protection. Some studies have conducted cross-country analyses on the cyclicality of 
social expenditures. For instance, Braun and Gresia (2003) compared the cyclicality of social 
expenditures in Latin American and the Caribbean with that in the OECD countries. Molina (2003) 
showed that social spending was cut disproportionally following the fall in GDP during the 1980s 
Latin America debt crisis. Doytch et al. (2010) analysed the link between indicators of the business 
cycle and social spending with a focus on health and education. In middle income countries, 
education spending was found to be acyclical while health spending was found to be procyclical, 
with the pattern reversing in low income countries. Granado et al. (2013) found that spending on 
education and health was procyclical in developing countries.  
 A number of explanations have been put forward to justify different cyclical fiscal patterns in 
different groups of countries. Inadequate access to international credit markets and lack of 
financial depth (Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008) 
as well as political distortions and weak institutions (Tornell and Lane, 19994; Alesina, Tabellini 
and Campante, 2008; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2013; and Fatas and Mihov 2013; 
Abbott, Cabral, Jones, Palacios, 2015) are the two main reasons behind the observation of fiscal 
procyclicality in developing countries. The first argument relates to the limited access to the 
international market with the credit rationing imposed by investors (especially during an economic 
downturn) limiting the ability of the government to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy. The 
second reason has been built around the perception that political issues and weak institutions are 
prime contributors to procyclical fiscal policies (Alesina et al., 2008). It also relates to the 
observation that higher fiscal counter-cyclicality was found in more developed countries and these 
tend to be characterized by better institutions (or of higher quality). Moreover, political systems in 
which power is diffused among many agents will witness a higher degree of fiscal procyclicality 
in contrast to a unitary system. 
  
                                                          
3 Emerging markets in particular, have a high reliance on external debt for financing government expenditures 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) and face countercyclical interest rates, meaning high borrowing costs during recessions 
exacerbate the financing problem. See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) for evidence of 
countercyclical interest rates. 
4 Tornell and Lane (1999) seminal framework highlighted different political blocs competing for a share of fiscal 
revenues. They argued that competition among these fiscal blocs increased during the boom period. This approach 
resulted in increased government expenditure as compared to increased general income – an effect known as voracity. 
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3. Empirical Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Time-Varying Social Spending Cyclicality 
 
Social spending has a stabilizing effect on the economy if one of its categories (e.g. 
spending on education or health - expressed in percentage of GDP)- increases when output growth 
declines and falls when output growth increases. The more countercyclical government social 
spending is, the higher its stabilizing effect—a relatively high level of government social spending 
when private demand is low will stabilize aggregate demand. In contrast, government social 
spending is destabilizing when it is procyclical. Our first step consists of assessing the degree of 
social spending cyclicality in each country i by estimating the response of changes in a given social 
spending category to changes in economic activity, as follows5: 
 
 ∆ln(𝑠 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∆ln (𝑦 ) + 𝜀  (1) 
where s is a social spending category (expressed in real terms using the GDP deflator), ∆ln (𝑦 ) is 
a measure of changes in economic activity—proxied by real GDP growth—and 𝛽  measures the 
degree of social spending cyclicality in country i:  𝛽 > 0 denotes social spending procyclicality;  
𝛽 < 0  denotes social spending counter-cyclicality. We look at four social spending categories, 
namely: health, social protection, pensions and education.  Data for these variables, as well as for 
real GDP and its deflator are taken from the IMF WEO database.  
We then generalize equation (1) by introducing the assumption that the regression 
coefficients may vary over time: 
  
 ∆ln(𝑠 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∆ln (𝑦 ) + 𝜀   (2) 
 
The coefficient of interest 𝛽 is assumed to change slowly and unsystematically over time and its 
conditional expected value today is equal to yesterday’s value. The change of the coefficient 𝛽 is 
denoted by 𝑣 , , which is assumed to be normally distributed with expectation zero and variance 
𝜎 : 
 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝑣  (3)  
 
Equation (2) and (3) are jointly estimated using the Varying-Coefficient model proposed 
by Schlicht (2003). In this approach the variances 𝜎  are calculated by a method-of-moments 
estimator that coincides with the maximum-likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter if the time 
series are sufficiently long and if the variance ratios are properly estimated (see Schlicht, 2003; 
Schlicht and Ludsteck, 2006 for more details).6 In addition, the Schlicht approach is useful 
                                                          
5 Several papers have employed this first difference specification – see e.g. Lane (1998), Woo (2009) and Thornton 
(2008). 
6 The approach proposed by Schlicht (2003) is very similar to that used by Aghion and Marinescu (2008). The main 
difference is in the computation of the variances 𝜎 . Aghion and Marinescu (2008) uses the Markov Chain Monte 
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because: i) it does not require knowledge of initial values prior to the estimation procedure. Instead, 
both the variance ratios and the coefficients are estimated simultaneously; ii) the property of the 
estimator that the time averages of the estimated time-varying coefficients are equal to its time-
invariant counterparts, permits easy interpretation of the results in relation to time-invariant results. 
The model described in equation (2) and (3) generalizes equation (1), which is obtained as a special 
case when the variance of the disturbances in the coefficients approaches to zero. 
 As discussed by Aghion and Marinescu (2008), this method has several advantages 
compared to other methods to compute time-varying coefficients such as rolling windows and 
Gaussian methods. First, it allows using all observations in the sample to estimate the degree of 
social spending cyclicality in each year—which by construction is not possible in the rolling 
windows approach. Second, changes in the degree of social spending cyclicality in a given year 
come from innovations in the same year, rather than from shocks occurring in neighbouring years. 
Third, it reflects the fact that changes in policy are slows and depends on the immediate past. 
Fourth, it reduces reverse causality problems when social spending cyclicality is used as 
explanatory variable as it depends on its own past (see next sub-section).  
 
3.2 Determinants of Social Spending Cyclicality 
 
The second step in our exercise is to empirically assess the importance of various 
macroeconomic, financial and institutional factors in affecting the degree of (the time-varying) 
social spending cyclicality. There is only one study – to the best of our knowledge – that assessed 
the determinants of fiscal cyclicality at the general level (i.e. not looking and public expenditure 
composition) using time-varying measures. This paper is by Aghion and Marinescu (2008) but 
they have focused on a subset of advanced economies. We estimate the following regression on 
an unbalanced panel comprised of 45 countries for which we have estimates of social spending 
cyclicality for at least 20 years7: 
 
 𝛽 = 𝛿 + 𝛾 + 𝜽′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜖  (4)                                                              
 
where 𝛽  are the time-varying coefficient estimates obtained from equation (2), 𝛿  are country-
fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries, and time-unvarying factors 
such as geographical variables; 𝛾  are time-fixed effects to control for global shocks; and 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a 
vector of time-varying macroeconomic, financial and institutional variables: 8 
                                                          
Carlo (MCMC) method to approximate these variances, while Schlicht (2003) uses a method-of-moments estimator. 
Moreover, the Kalman filter as implemented in common econometric packages typically uses the diffusion of priors 
for its initiation, but it still produces many corner solutions and often does not achieve convergence. Schlicht and 
Ludsteck (2006) compare the performance of the moment estimator and the Kalman smoother in terms of the mean 
squared error on simulated data, and they conclude that the moment estimator outperforms the Kalman filter on small 
samples with a size of up to 100 observations. 
7 List of countries is provided in the Appendix. 
8 See the Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for sources, definitions and summary statistics of all the variables used. 
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As far as macroeconomic variables are concerned, we include real GDP per capita as a 
proxy of economic development in line with Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Mpatswe, Tapsoba and 
York (2011). This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with procyclicality. Government 
size has typically been found to be the most important driver (Gali, 1994; Debrun et al., 2008; 
Debrun and Kapoor, 2011; Woo, 2009; Furceri, 2010; Afonso and Jalles, 2013; Fatas and Mihov, 
2013). We include the government expenditures-to-GDP ratio which is expected to negatively 
affect the degree of procyclicality under the assumption of unitary elasticity of taxes to GDP. In 
order to reduce reverse causality, all the macroeconomic variables enter with one lag.9 
 Several variables have been used as proxies of the stringency of financial constraints. One 
is the degree of trade openness (defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP) as a measure 
of access to foreign capital markets: economies that are more open to trade tend to be more exposed 
to external shocks and may use more actively fiscal policies in order to provide increased 
stabilization (Rodrik, 1998; Lane, 2003; Woo, 2009). Another is capital account openness (proxied 
by the Chinn-Ito index) which was found to affect fiscal cyclicality as foreign capital tends to flow 
in (out) during expansions (recessions), therefore increasing the cost of financing counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies (Aghion and Marinescu, 2008). We also use a measure of financial deepening the 
private credit-to-GDP ratio, as a higher level of financial development positively influences the 
ability of the government to borrow during downturns, and therefore it is expected to decrease 
fiscal procyclicality. Finally, Leaven and Valencia (2010) financial crises dummies are included 
but their effect on fiscal cyclicality is ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, governments would be 
willing to run expansionary fiscal policies to offset the contractionary effects of the crises. On the 
other hand, the cost of financing countercyclical fiscal policies may increase during crises, 
particularly in countries with high debt levels.10 
 Institutional variables comprise of the following. We include dummies for the occurrence 
of executive and legislative elections since during elections politicians may be tempted to change 
fiscal components for electoral reasons and not necessarily for macroeconomic stabilization 
purposes (Drazen 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Then, following Acemoglu et al. (2013) and 
Fatas and Mihov (2013) we include a proxy for constrains on the executive that captures potential 
veto points on the decisions of the executive.  This variable is likely to reduce spending volatility 
and negatively influence procyclicality. Other political variables are the margin of majority, 
proportional representation, the existence of parliamentary regimes, checks and balances, polity2 
indicator and regime durability. 
The dependent variable in equation (4) is based on estimates which means that the residuals 
from that regression can be thought of as having two components. The first is sampling error while 
the second is the random shock that would have been obtained even if the dependent variable was 
                                                          
9 Recall additionally, that the TVC method employed to get our dependent variable, also has the property of 
minimizing reverse causality problems since the time-varying estimated cyclicality coefficient depends on its own 
the past (see equation 3 and explanations in section 3.1). Similar results are obtained using contemporaneous 
regressors (results available upon request). 
10 Other financial variables that have been employed include credit ratings and the spread of sovereign debt over the 
US debt (Alesina et al., 2008). We are not using these since they would dramatically reduce the sample size. 
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observed directly as opposed to estimated. To account for the presence of this un-measurable error 
term, equation (4) is estimated using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). Specifically, the WLS 
estimator assumes that the errors 𝜖  in equation (1) are distributed as 𝜖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎 𝑠⁄ ), where 
𝑠  are the estimated standard deviations of the social spending cyclicality coefficient for each 
country i, and 𝜎  is an unknown parameter that is estimated in the second-stage regression.  
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Stylized Facts: Social Spending Cyclicality Over Time 
 
We first report the average level and the time path of the coefficient of social spending 
cyclicality estimated in equation (2) and (3) for a sample of at most 46 developing countries for 
which we have time-varying estimates for at least 20 years (Figure 2). Depending on the social 
spending category in question, the number and composition of countries may change due to data 
availability.11 As a first observation, it is worth noting that the time-average health spending 
cyclicality coefficient is positive (about 0.1), which is consistent with the fact that this type of 
expenditures in our sample is procyclical. However, based on the one standard deviation 
confidence bands we cannot reject the null that the response of changes in real health spending to 
changes real GDP is zero (that is, we get, generally, acyclicality). For social protection spending 
cyclicality, the time-average coefficient equals -0.4, with fluctuations between -0.6 and 0. The 
coefficient has becoming more negative over time hinting to some counter-cyclical behaviour but, 
once again, confidence bands suggest acyclicality in this social spending category. A similar 
pattern can be observed for education spending cyclicality. It has generally been positive and stable 
over time, despite some downward trending at the end of the period, in line with Frankel et al.  
(2013) prediction. Finally, regarding the cyclicality of pensions spending, this is the only category 
that shows a clear procyclical behaviour and the degree of procyclicality has been increasing since 
the late 1990s. 
 
  
                                                          
11 For health expenditures we have a sample comprising of 29 countries; for social production expenditures we cover 




Figure 2. Social Spending Cyclicality Over Time 
Health Social protection 
Pensions Education 
Note: the figure displays the time profile of the time-varying coefficient estimates for four different social spending 
categories and covering countries with at least 20 observations. See footnote 9 for the number of countries in each 
panel. Confidence bands are shown for both the time-average and time-varying estimates based on plus or minus one 
standard deviation. 
 
The second observation concerns the country heterogeneity hidden by the time profile 
previously covered. Figure 3 plots the average time-varying cyclicality for the four different social 
spending categories (it excludes outliers for better readability). Indeed, there is great variation 
between average cyclicality estimates with the great majority of developing countries in our 
sample showing procyclical social spending behaviour. However, yet again, as Frankel et al. 
(2013) allude to, some countries seem to be graduating away from procyclicality into counter-
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Figure 3. Average Social Spending Cyclicality by country 
 
Note: extreme outliers were excluded for better visibility. 
 
Country specific charts for each social spending category displaying time-varying coefficient 
estimates are available in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The degree of health spending procyclicality 
has increased over time for 9 out of 29 countries in the sample. Some, after a period of increasing 
procyclicality, saw an inversion of the previous trend (e.g. Argentina, Egypt, Senegal, South 
Africa, Turkey, Mali). Concerning social protection spending procyclicality, several of the set of 
developing countries covered saw an increase over time (e.g. Bangladesh, Congo, Honduras, 
Kenya, Romania). In others the degree of procyclicality has stabilized in recent years (e.g. Burkina 
Faso, Egypt, Mozambique, Philippines, Malaysia). In the case of pensions spending cyclicality, 
several countries experienced a decline in the degree of its procyclicality since the early to mid-
1990s (e.g. Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Uganda). In contrast, countries like 
Chile or Tanzania, the rise in procyclicality over time has been the norm. Finally, when it comes 
to education spending cyclicality, we also have a heterogeneous picture: countries like Bolivia, 
Bulgaria, Honduras or Mexico, have seen their degree of procyclicality declining over time; in 
contrast, Colombia, Indonesia, Romania or Senegal, saw the opposite movement. 
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4.2 Empirical Findings: Determinants of Social Spending Cyclicality 
 
Table 1 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (4) for the case of health spending 
using different econometric specifications. The coefficients associated with the various 
determinants typically exhibit the expected sign and confirm the conjectures discussed above. 
Starting with the set of macroeconomic variables, we find that social spending cyclicality is 
robustly and negatively associated with the level of financial development, with an increase of 10 
percentage points in the credit-to-GDP ratio decreasing the degree of health procyclicality by about 
0.3-0.5 (i.e. by about 0.2-0.3 standard deviation). We also find that more developed and open to 
trade developing economies tend to have a smaller degree of health procyclicality. Similarly, 
developing countries with larger government are also able to provide more stabilization through 
increased health spending: an increase of 10 percentage points in the government expenditure-to-
GDP ratio decreases health procyclicality 0.3-0.4. Finally, we find that health procyclicality does 
not generally increase during financial crises once other macroeconomic variables are controlled 
for but the result depends on the exact type of crisis under consideration (see column 3). Our results 
suggest that health procyclicality increases during banking crises but declines during sovereign 
debt crises. Looking at the political variables, we find that constraints on the executive are robustly 
negatively and significantly associated with health procyclicality. The results are consistent with 
the evidence provided in Fatas and Mihov (2013) and Lane (2003), who find that more constraints 
on the executive tend to reduce government spending volatility and positively influence the overall 
role of fiscal policy stabilization. A similar effect is obtained by better institutional quality, as 
proxied by either polity 2 or checks and balances. Regime durability, however, seems to be 
positively correlated with health procyclicality, possibly due to the growing influence of lobbies 
and other pressure groups next to politicians. Finally, the presence of expenditure and revenue 





Table 1. The determinants of health spending cyclicality (WLS) 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.0302*** -0.0360*** -0.0364*** -0.0510*** -0.0470*** -0.0311*** -0.0496*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.2969*** -0.3609*** -0.3502*** -0.3638*** -0.5043*** -0.4036*** -0.5648*** 
 (0.099) (0.109) (0.108) (0.100) (0.102) (0.100) (0.103) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.5763*** -0.6900*** -0.6973*** -0.6926*** -0.5128*** -0.6141*** -0.5300*** 
 (0.101) (0.109) (0.109) (0.101) (0.096) (0.099) (0.094) 
Capital account openness (t-1) -0.0277** -0.0314** -0.0305** -0.0253** -0.0056 -0.0215* -0.0041 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Government expenditure to 
GDP (t-1) 
-0.0396*** -0.0440*** -0.0435*** -0.0397*** -0.0387*** -0.0360*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Banking Crises   0.1044*     
   (0.061)     
Currency Crises   -0.0366     
   (0.063)     
Debt Crises   -0.2978*     
   (0.179)     
Financial Crises  0.0176      
  (0.045)      
Checks and Balances    -0.0178***    
    (0.006)    
Polity2    -0.0147***    
    (0.006)    
Regime Durability    0.0059***    
    (0.002)    
Executive constraints     -0.0387***  -0.0385*** 
     (0.015)  (0.015) 
Parliamentary regime     0.0825  -0.0314 
     (0.102)  (0.109) 
Presidential election held     -0.0359  -0.0340 
     (0.039)  (0.038) 
Legislative election held     0.0117  0.0123 
     (0.029)  (0.029) 
Proportional representation     0.9121***  0.9312*** 
     (0.088)  (0.087) 
Margin of majority     0.0869  0.1329 
     (0.097)  (0.096) 
Expenditure rule      -0.1303* -0.0972 
      (0.072) (0.065) 
Revenue rule      -0.6004*** -0.5558*** 
      (0.135) (0.154) 
Debt rule      0.1137* 0.2303*** 
      (0.065) (0.063) 
Observations 533 466 466 527 502 533 502 
R-squared 0.9526 0.9539 0.9544 0.9561 0.9644 0.9547 0.9661 
Note: Results obtained by estimating equation (4).  Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Country 
and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
At the same time, some of these determinants tend to have different effects depending on the 
social spending category under scrutiny. For example, turning to Table 2 – that looks at social 
protection -  here the level of financial deepening, trade and capital account openness are positively 
associated with its procyclicality. The level of economic development does not seem important in 
this case to explain social protection cyclicality movements. Financial crises, however, contribute 
to mitigate the degree of social protection procyclicality. Moreover, with the exception of checks 
and balances (which has the a priori expected sign), none of the institutional and political economy 





Table 2. The determinants of social protection spending cyclicality (WLS) 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Credit to GDP (t-1) 0.0771 0.1630*** 0.1647*** 0.0974* 0.0625 0.0944* 0.0919 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) (0.056) (0.066) (0.056) (0.068) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.1853 -0.1721 -0.0834 -0.6740 -0.1382 -0.1470 0.0188 
 (0.398) (0.438) (0.430) (0.428) (0.542) (0.406) (0.558) 
Trade openness (t-1) 1.1200*** 1.4923*** 1.3605*** 1.0833*** 1.1041*** 1.2987*** 1.2936*** 
 (0.312) (0.355) (0.346) (0.325) (0.347) (0.330) (0.363) 
Capital account openness (t-1) 0.0691* 0.1127** 0.1011** 0.0443 0.0667* 0.0800** 0.0772* 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.042) 
Government expenditure to GDP (t-1) 0.0079 0.0073 0.0103 0.0048 0.0172 -0.0071 -0.0001 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) 
Banking Crises   -1.1525***     
   (0.238)     
Currency Crises   0.5311*     
   (0.289)     
Debt Crises   -0.6605     
   (0.708)     
Financial Crises  -0.5150***      
  (0.192)      
Checks and Balances    -0.1493***    
    (0.051)    
Polity2    0.0012    
    (0.020)    
Regime Durability    -0.0077    
    (0.008)    
Executive constraints     -0.0456  -0.0678 
     (0.051)  (0.055) 
Parliamentary regime     -0.1712  -0.1987 
     (3.219)  (3.218) 
Presidential election held     0.1427  0.1443 
     (0.168)  (0.168) 
Legislative election held     -0.0039  -0.0092 
     (0.123)  (0.123) 
Proportional representation     0.1714  0.1733 
     (0.376)  (0.378) 
Margin of majority     -0.4218  -0.5655 
     (0.407)  (0.456) 
Expenditure rule      0.1810 0.1340 
      (0.275) (0.342) 
Revenue rule      0.7151 0.9029 
      (0.800) (1.091) 
Debt rule      -0.3524 -0.4462* 
      (0.234) (0.262) 
Observations 385 341 341 381 353 385 353 
R-squared 0.8570 0.8604 0.8695 0.8620 0.8542 0.8582 0.8558 
Note: Results obtained by estimating equation (4).  Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Country 
and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Turning to pensions, its degree of procyclicality is positively and significantly affected by the 
size of the government and degree of capital account openness. As in the case of health spending, 
the level of financial deepening, economic development and trade openness, all contribute to lower 
the procyclicality of pensions expenditures. As far as political variables are concerned, having a 
parliamentary regime with large margins of majority is preferable if one is concerned about 





Table 3. The determinants of pensions spending cyclicality (WLS) 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.0129*** -0.0109*** -0.0106*** -0.0123*** -0.0133*** -0.0076* -0.0092** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.2732*** -0.2663*** -0.2687*** -0.2278*** -0.1923** -0.3075*** -0.2359*** 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.081) (0.068) (0.082) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.2517*** -0.2654*** -0.2662*** -0.2549*** -0.2751*** -0.2474*** -0.2608*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.056) (0.060) 
Capital account openness (t-1) 0.0235*** 0.0301*** 0.0301*** 0.0254*** 0.0250*** 0.0299*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Government expenditure to 
GDP (t-1) 
0.0094** 0.0078* 0.0076* 0.0104** 0.0144*** 0.0053 0.0101** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Banking Crises   -0.0202     
   (0.034)     
Currency Crises   -0.0023     
   (0.035)     
Debt Crises   -0.0188     
   (0.064)     
Financial Crises  -0.0244      
  (0.025)      
Checks and Balances    0.0042    
    (0.005)    
Polity2    -0.0034    
    (0.004)    
Regime Durability    -0.0015    
    (0.002)    
Executive constraints     -0.0130  -0.0059 
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Parliamentary regime     -0.4288***  -0.3445*** 
     (0.095)  (0.097) 
Presidential election held     0.0251  0.0292 
     (0.027)  (0.027) 
Legislative election held     -0.0171  -0.0177 
     (0.020)  (0.020) 
Proportional representation     -0.0325  -0.0655 
     (0.046)  (0.046) 
Margin of majority     -0.1249*  -0.1270* 
     (0.071)  (0.070) 
Expenditure rule      -0.0953** -0.0712 
      (0.045) (0.045) 
Revenue rule      -0.1231 -0.1785 
      (0.174) (0.228) 
Debt rule      -0.1487*** -0.1136*** 
      (0.033) (0.035) 
Observations 702 628 628 694 610 702 610 
R-squared 0.9643 0.9676 0.9676 0.9657 0.9610 0.9660 0.9621 
Note: Results obtained by estimating equation (4).  Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Country 
and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Finally, with regard to education spending cyclicality determinants, we still obtain - as in the 
case of health - negative and statistically significant coefficients on the level of financial 
deepening, trade and capital account openness and government size. However, in contrast, the 
level of development appears to be positively correlated with this social category’s procyclicality. 
This seems at odds with previous evidence (Talvi and Vegh and Mpatswe et al., 2011) whose 
prediction was that as nations develop and become richer, their fiscal policies become more 
stabilizing (of counter-cyclical). None of the institutional or political determinants seem to matter 




Table 4. The determinants of education spending cyclicality (WLS) 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.0690*** -0.0659*** -0.0653*** -0.0648*** -0.0846*** -0.0677*** -0.0769*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.4120** 0.3145* 0.3017* 0.5106*** 0.6182*** 0.3804** 0.6632*** 
 (0.167) (0.177) (0.177) (0.173) (0.215) (0.170) (0.221) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.8069*** -0.8504*** -0.8704*** -0.8241*** -1.2200*** -0.7430*** -1.1633*** 
 (0.202) (0.212) (0.212) (0.206) (0.220) (0.206) (0.226) 
Capital account openness (t-1) -0.0477** -0.0655** -0.0660** -0.0457* -0.0594** -0.0445* -0.0532* 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
Government expenditure to 
GDP (t-1) 
-0.0880*** -0.0808*** -0.0805*** -0.0883*** -0.0973*** -0.0864*** -0.0947*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Banking Crises   -0.2267*     
   (0.119)     
Currency Crises   0.0508     
   (0.110)     
Debt Crises   0.2505     
   (0.224)     
Financial Crises  -0.0135      
  (0.083)      
Checks and Balances    0.0055    
    (0.028)    
Polity2    0.0009    
    (0.010)    
Regime Durability    -0.0009    
    (0.004)    
Executive constraints     0.0483  0.0346 
     (0.031)  (0.033) 
Parliamentary regime     0.2549  -0.0957 
     (0.180)  (0.233) 
Presidential election held     0.0090  0.0028 
     (0.087)  (0.087) 
Legislative election held     0.0048  0.0041 
     (0.071)  (0.071) 
Proportional representation     0.1935  0.2286* 
     (0.136)  (0.137) 
Margin of majority     0.3265  0.3258 
     (0.209)  (0.211) 
Expenditure rule      0.2013 0.2215 
      (0.198) (0.206) 
Revenue rule      -0.0460 -0.1036 
      (0.278) (0.370) 
Debt rule      0.2327* 0.2929* 
      (0.127) (0.154) 
Observations 524 482 482 519 457 524 457 
R-squared 0.8763 0.8773 0.8787 0.8786 0.8827 0.8782 0.8844 
Note: Results obtained by estimating equation (4).  Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Country 
and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
As a robustness check, we replicated the results for the full specification represented by column 
7 in Tables 1-4, by alternatively excluding country and/or time fixed effects. Results (available 
upon request) confirm the previous statistical significance of both macroeconomic and political 
variables. 
A key question is then how can social spending counter-cyclicality be enhanced, particularly 
in developing countries with high debt-to-GDP levels? Our next exercise consists in conditioning 
countries based on their level of public debt but also on their level of financial development and 
institutional quality. More specifically, we split countries between those whose country average is 
above/below the panel’s median values for public-debt-to-GDP ratio, the credit-to-GDP ratio and 
polity2, respectively. As before we will focus on the specification represented by column 7 in 
Tables 1-4. For each social spending category, results conditioned on these three aspects are shown 
in Appendix Tables A3-A4. 
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Starting with Appendix Table A3, panel I, we can see that the negative and statistically 
significant effect of financial deepening, GDP per capita and trade openness are particularly 
relevant in lowering the degree of health procyclicality in countries highly indebted and 
characterized by low institutional quality. The beneficial aspect (in a stabilizing sense) of fiscal 
rules, seems to kick in more strongly in highly indebted countries as well. Constraints on the 
executive exert a downward force on the degree of health procyclicality in countries with low 
public debt and poor institutions.  
In Appendix Table A3, panel II we observe, in turn, that the more open the economy is, in 
countries with low debt and poor institutions, the lower the procyclicality of social protection 
spending. A similar conclusion applies for constraints on the executive as in the case of health.  
 In Appendix Table A4, panel I we note the fact that higher financial (economic) 
development exerts a negative influence on pensions spending cyclicality in countries 
characterized by low debt (financial deepening) and poor institutions. The more open an economy 
is, the lower the degree of pensions procyclicality in countries with high public debt and financially 
more developed. Also, debt rules appear to act more strongly (in the sense of lowering 
procyclicality) in those countries with high public debt, developed financial markets and poor 
institutions.  
Finally, as far as education is concerned, Appendix Table A4, panel II shows that financial 
deepening reduces education procyclicality in countries with poor institutions. Similarly trade 
openness has a negative and significant effect of education cyclicality in countries with poor 
institutions, but also those that are lightly indebted and do not have very developed financial 
markets. The larger the size of the government the more countercyclical education spending is, 
particularly in countries with low debt, development financial markets and poor institutions. 
 
The model described above is reduced-form and does not allow making causal statements, 
meaning that the use of instruments is required.12 While adding lagged covariates partly corrects 
for these biases, endogeneity can still arise from other omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity 
and selection effects), measurement errors in variables and reverse causality (simultaneity). Since 
causality can run in both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors may be correlated with 
the error term. We begin by re-estimating specification 4 of the previous set of tables using a Two 
Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimator where instruments are the growth rate of main trading 
partners and second and third lags of the regressors. In order to account for dynamics, we use a 
system GMM estimator that exploits stationarity restrictions. This method jointly estimates 
Equation (4) in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the dependent and 
independent variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first differences of the regressors 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).13 GMM estimators are unbiased, and 
compared with ordinary least squares or fixed effects (within-group) estimators, exhibit the 
                                                          
12 We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for this comment. 
13 Specifically, we run the two-step system-GMM estimator with Windmeijer standard errors. The significance of the 
results is robust to different choices of instruments and predetermined variables. 
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smallest bias and variance (Arellano and Bond, 1991).14 We also rely on the Pesaran (2006) 
common correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator that accounts for the presence of unobserved 
common factors by including cross-section averages of the dependent and independent variables 
in the regression equation, and where the averages are interacted with country-dummies to allow 
for country-specific parameters. This estimator is a generalization of the fixed effects estimator 
that allows for the possibility of cross section correlation. Including the (weighted) cross sectional 
averages of the dependent variable and individual specific regressors is suggested by Pesaran 
(2006, 2007) as an effective way to filter out the impacts of common factors, which could be 
common technological shocks or macroeconomic shocks, causing between group error 
dependence.  
Table 5 shows the results of these series of robustness checks. Looking at specifications 1-4 
with TSLS we note that the Kleibergen-Paap statistic of weak exogeneity confirms the validity of 
the instruments used. However, in most specifications we only conservatively reject the null 
hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exogenous or, in other words, the p-values of the 
corresponding test statistic are too close or only slightly above 10 percent thus suggesting that the 
use of instrumental variable estimation may be unwarranted. Moreover, in general most signs and 
significance levels are retained in comparison with those from Tables 1-4 for the different 
dependent variables. This is reassuring as a robustness check. Moving on to the dynamic setting 
with the GMM estimation, the consistency of the obtained set of estimates was checked by using 
the Hansen and the Arellano-Bond tests. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analog of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process, cannot reject the null that the full set of orthogonality 
conditions is valid. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error terms. Here coefficient estimates 
generally loose statistical significance, maybe because the system GMM estimator is a very 
demanding one. Finally, using the CCEP estimator does not reveal any additional insights, as most 
coefficient estimates turn out to be statistically not different from zero. Then again, conducting 
Pesaran’s (2004) Cross-Sectional Dependence test (available upon request), we do no reject the 
null of cross-section independence with a p-value comfortably above the 10 percent level. 
 
  
                                                          
14 As far as information on the choice of lagged levels (differences) used as instruments in the difference (level) 
equation, as work by Bowsher (2002) and, more recently, Roodman (2009) have indicated, when it comes to moment 
conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are likely to suffer from 
“overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or exceeds) the number of groups/countries (as a simple 
rule of thumb). In the present case, the validity of instruments was examined using Sargan’s test of overidentifying 
restrictions. Intuitively, the system GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the first-differenced equations but 
exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels. 
 
 
Table 5. The determinants of cyclicality: Robustness to alternative estimators 
 
Dependent Cyclicality Variable health Social protection pensions education health Social protection pensions education health Social protection pensions education 
Estimator IV IV IV IV SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM CCEP CCEP CCEP CCEP 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) (8) 9) (10) (11) 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.2386*** 0.8849*** 0.0149 -0.3012*** -0.0354** -0.0403 -0.0109 -0.0042 -0.0207 0.2188 -0.0545* -0.0939 
 (0.055) (0.138) (0.057) (0.030) (0.014) (0.110) (0.017) (0.038) (0.122) (0.348) (0.034) (0.070) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.0244 -0.9360*** 0.0443 0.2553*** -0.1983 -0.2198 -0.3148** -0.3232 -0.3054 0.1513 0.3364 -0.5703 
 (0.075) (0.169) (0.094) (0.045) (0.162) (0.837) (0.148) (0.353) (0.324) (0.891) (0.322) (0.588) 
Trade openness (t-1) 0.4174 1.6195*** -2.0171*** -1.5421*** -0.0280 -0.1754 -0.0594 0.3138 -0.0178 -0.9799 0.1554 0.1700 
 (0.287) (0.562) (0.516) (0.386) (0.092) (0.695) (0.106) (0.195) (0.061) (0.801) (0.173) (0.128) 
Capital account openness (t-1) -0.6053*** 0.7694*** 0.1084 -0.3814*** -0.0122 0.0326 -0.0098 -0.0069 0.0056 0.2474* -0.1015 0.0240 
 (0.084) (0.179) (0.132) (0.067) (0.026) (0.058) (0.020) (0.062) (0.020) (0.142) (0.080) (0.041) 
Government expenditure to GDP (t-1) -0.0462* 0.1957*** 0.1411*** -0.0150 -0.0064 -0.0442 -0.0010 -0.0198 -0.0029 -0.0271 0.0291 -0.0025 
 (0.026) (0.057) (0.043) (0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.008) (0.018) (0.005) (0.047) (0.033) (0.017) 
Checks and Balances 0.0063 0.3418 0.0466 -0.0691 -0.0006 -0.0352 -0.0265*** 0.0014 1.5231 0.1494 0.0088 -0.2929 
 (0.059) (0.217) (0.103) (0.075) (0.011) (0.065) (0.008) (0.026) (1.061) (0.181) (0.087) (0.316) 
Polity2 -0.1221*** -0.0965* -0.1459*** -0.0024 -0.0226** 0.0451 0.0029 0.0230* -0.2106 -0.0954 0.0430 0.0157 
 (0.025) (0.053) (0.036) (0.019) (0.008) (0.044) (0.003) (0.013) (0.170) (0.063) (0.038) (0.034) 
Regime Durability 0.0312*** 0.0983*** -0.0329*** -0.0263*** 0.0003 0.0173 -0.0042* -0.0056 0.0056 -0.1589 -0.0075 -0.0027 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.021) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.111) (0.015) (0.016) 
             
Observations 521 384 692 497 505 381 692 497 527 391 713 513 
R-squared 0.1952 0.2267 0.0926 0.2359     0.9997 0.9861 0.9947 0.9977 
Kleibergen-Paap test (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04         
Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity (p-
value) 
0.09 0.12 0.10 0.08         
ar1 (p-value)     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
ar2 (p-value)     0.512 0.481 0.322 0.127     
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions (p-value) 
    0.81 0.29 0.87 0.23     
Note: Results obtained by estimating equation (4) with IV (TSLS), system GMM and CCEP estimators.  Standard errors in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects were estimated 
but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of parsimony. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of weak exogeneity tests the validity of 
the instruments used. The Wu-Hausman Test of endogeneity tests the null hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous. Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions tests the 
overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The Arellano-Bond tests (ar1 and ar2) evaluate first and 
second order serial correlation in the error terms.    ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Finally, future research should inspect the consequences of social spending procyclicality to 
macroeconomic stability. As a teaser, a simple bivariate unconditional scatterplot of each social 
category cyclicality and a measure of output volatility (proxied by the rolling standard deviation 
of real GDP growth) is shown in Figure 4. It illustrates the general point that the higher the degree 
of social spending procyclicality (particularly when it comes to pensions expenditures), the higher 
the macroeconomic volatility associated. Hence, despite this being an association (and not a 
causation), there are merits in graduating away from procyclical fiscal policy. Indeed, several 
studies seem to agree that a timely counter-cyclical response of fiscal policy to (demand) shocks 
is likely to deliver considerably lower output and consumption volatility (see e.g. Debrun and 
Kapoor, 2011; Fatas and Mihov, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. Social Spending Cyclicality and Macroeconomic Volatility 
Note: the figure displays the correlation between each social spending category average time-varying coefficient 
estimates and the average rolling standard deviation of real GDP growth. Using the output gap instead does not 





Fiscal policy can influence medium-term growth through its support to macroeconomic 
stability. Most research on fiscal policy cyclicality has, for a long time, focused on advanced 
economies due to data availability and quality reasons. In this paper we focused on a sample of 45 
developing countries and went more granular into the expenditure components of government’s 
social policy. Using time-varying estimates of social spending cyclicality, we first provided a novel 


























































































characterization of its behaviour across countries and over time and then we went on to empirically 
inspect its main macroeconomic and institutional determinants.  
At the aggregate average, we found that, with the exception of spending on pensions which 
has been procyclical over time, the other social spending components have generally been 
acyclical in developing countries. However, sample averages hide high degrees of heterogeneity 
between countries. The great majority of developing countries in our sample displayed procyclical 
social spending behaviour. However, as Frankel et al. (2013) allude to, some countries seem to be 
graduating away from procyclicality into counter-cyclicality but no clear regional pattern seems 
to exist. 
Moreover, while a large body of the literature has typically found that government size is 
the main determinant of the stabilizing role of government spending policies, the results presented 
in this paper suggest that other macroeconomic policies and institutional and political 
characteristics can also affect the degree of social spending cyclicality for a given government 
size. In particular, while some drivers affect different social components’ cyclicality differently, 
in general, our results suggest that in addition to political constraints, policies aimed at fostering 
financial deepening, the level of economic institutions and trade openness can significantly reduce 
the degree of procyclicality of social spending.  Moreover, fiscal rules seem to be important in 
curbing the procyclical behaviour of social spending. That being said, some results are conditional 
on whether countries are characterized by high or low levels of public indebtedness and if they 
operate under developed financial markets and strong institutions, or not.  
Future research on the topic should consider looking at the consequences of procyclical 
social policy, since as we briefly demonstrated – using unconditional associations -, the larger the 
degree of procyclicality, the higher the macroeconomic instability (which compromises growth 
prospects).   
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Table A2. Variables, definitions and sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Credit to 
GDP  
Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector by 
financial institutions (in percent of GDP) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
GDP per 
capita  
Real gross domestic product divided by population World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Trade 
openness  




KAOPEN is an index measuring a country's degree of 
capital account openness 
Chinn-Ito Index of Financial Openness 
Government 
expenditure 
to GDP  
Total government expenditure to GDP ratio IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Executive 
constraints 
This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. 
Polity IV Project 
Parliamentary 
regime 
Parliamentary, Assembly-elected President, or 
Presidential. 
Polity IV Project 
Presidential 
election held 
Takes value 1 if there was an executive election in 
this year. 
Polity IV Project 
Legislative 
election held 
Takes value 1 if there was a legislative election in this 
year 
Polity IV Project 
Proportional 
representation 
Takes value 1 if candidates are elected based on the 
percent of votes received by their party and/or if our 
sources specifically call the system “proportional 
representation”. “0” otherwise. 
Polity IV Project 
Margin of 
majority 
This is the fraction of seats held by the government. Polity IV Project 
Checks and 
balances 
Checks and balances Database of Political Institutions 2015 
Polity2 Revised combined polity score from -10 to +10 (with 
larger values indicating better institutions) 
Polity IV Project 
Regime 
durability  
Number of years since the most recent regime change Polity IV Project 
Financial 
crises 
Dummy variable taking value 1 when a banking or 
currency or debt crisis occurs. 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
Expenditure 
rule 
Takes the value 1 when an expenditure rule is in place IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 
Revenue rule Takes the value 1 when a revenue-based rule is in 
place 
IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm 




POLCON index takes into account the number of 
veto points faced by the executive power, as well as 
the distribution of political preferences across 
different branches of government. 
Political Constraint Dataset, Henisz (2000) 




Weighted average of annual growth of main trading 
partners (weight by trade share in domestic trade 
volume) 
IMF’s WEO  
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Table A2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Health spending (%GDP) 1823 3.93 2.21 0.20 10.38 
Social protection spending (%GDP) 1598 8.51 7.02 0.002 28.31 
Pensions spending (%GDP) 1826 4.94 4.31 0.001 17.79 
Education spending (% GDP) 1614 4.18 1.87 0.40 15.98 
Credit to GDP (log) 2017 12.12 3.91 -13.35 21.66 
GDP per capita (log) 2109 10.70 2.16 6.39 16.91 
Trade openness  1856 0.675 0.471 0.108 4.38 
Capital account openness  1924 0.39 1.59 -1.85 2.45 
Government expenditure to GDP  2109 15.57 6.02 0.86 40.4 
Banking Crises 1802 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Currency Crises 1802 0.03 0.19 0 1 
Debt Crises 1802 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Financial Crises 1802 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Checks and Balances 2063 3.21 1.87 1 18 
Polity2 2043 4.45 6.54 -10 10 
Regime Durability 2044 33.15 38.30 0 203 
Executive constraints 2011 5.26 2.03 1 7 
Parliamentary regime 2109 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Presidential election held 2085 0.09 0.29 1 1 
Legislative election held 2085 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Proportional representation 1587 0.88 0.46 0 1 
Margin of majority 1727 0.64 0.19 0.03 1 
Expenditure rule 2109 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Revenue rule 2109 0.04 0.19 0 1 




Table A3. The determinants of health and social protection spending cyclicality: Robustness (WLS) 
Panel  I – health spending cyclicality II- social protection spending cyclicality 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constraint  High debt Low debt High finance Low finance High polity Low polity High debt Low debt High finance Low finance High polity Low polity 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.0341*** -0.0130 -0.3568*** -0.0531*** 0.0001*** -0.0104 -0.0560 0.2159 0.6045*** -0.2302 -0.1012 0.8467*** 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.065) (0.013) (0.000) (0.024) (0.083) (0.146) (0.150) (0.175) (0.101) (0.118) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.3659*** 0.2297 -0.0555 0.0887 0.0011*** -0.6332*** -0.9919 9.1166*** 0.5493 0.0086 -1.8452* 0.5887 
 (0.116) (0.214) (0.198) (0.200) (0.000) (0.161) (0.828) (0.905) (0.679) (1.432) (1.146) (0.738) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.2975*** 0.0942 -0.5202*** -0.3575** 0.0009*** -0.7867*** 1.3302*** -2.0592** 1.1847*** -1.0801 1.5688*** -1.5259*** 
 (0.093) (0.279) (0.119) (0.164) (0.000) (0.133) (0.483) (1.026) (0.415) (1.540) (0.589) (0.547) 
Capital account openness (t-1) 0.0497*** -0.0154 0.0252 -0.0049 -0.0001*** 0.0062 0.2290*** 0.1868*** 0.0672 -0.1137 0.0191 -0.3253*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000) (0.017) (0.075) (0.064) (0.047) (0.176) (0.068) (0.080) 
Government expenditure to GDP (t-1) -0.0304*** -0.0414*** -0.0440*** -0.0317*** 0.0000*** -0.0321*** -0.0066 0.2612*** -0.0209 0.0435 -0.0007 -0.0269 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.039) (0.083) (0.049) (0.060) (0.054) (0.043) 
Executive constraints -0.0059 -0.2399*** -0.0588*** -0.0248 0.0006*** -0.0737*** 0.0178 -0.1097 -0.1558** -0.1877 -0.0054 -0.4672*** 
 (0.014) (0.042) (0.018) (0.030) (0.000) (0.019) (0.083) (0.073) (0.067) (0.165) (0.093) (0.110) 
Parliamentary regime -2.5025*** -0.3622*** -0.0978 0.2299* -0.0001 -0.4155* -2.8191 2.2086 0.0675 -0.0613 -4.9502 1.2608 
 (0.357) (0.115) (0.196) (0.141) (0.000) (0.224) (2.512) (1.509) (2.903) (4.248) (3.594) (1.923) 
Presidential election held -0.0306 0.0595 -0.0018 -0.0478 -0.0000 -0.0374 0.1996 0.1043 -0.0579 0.3576 0.2457 0.3863 
 (0.039) (0.065) (0.061) (0.050) (0.000) (0.058) (0.259) (0.153) (0.199) (0.343) (0.233) (0.247) 
Legislative election held 0.0060 -0.0446 0.0066 0.0061 0.0000 0.0246 -0.0195 -0.0328 0.1198 -0.1578 -0.0474 -0.1276 
 (0.026) (0.065) (0.038) (0.043) (0.000) (0.044) (0.145) (0.149) (0.133) (0.278) (0.195) (0.159) 
Proportional representation 0.8867*** 2.6728* -2.1214*** 0.8588***  0.9458*** -0.4121 61.2762*** -0.0043 0.5294 -0.6501 0.6032 
 (0.074) (1.485) (0.251) (0.089)  (0.106) (0.396) (6.679) (0.369) (1.315) (0.542) (0.713) 
Margin of majority -0.0050 -0.4090 0.0464 0.1143 0.0002 0.1563 -1.0008* 0.2850 0.2981 -1.1157 -0.7149 0.7030 
 (0.088) (0.289) (0.147) (0.139) (0.000) (0.138) (0.620) (0.469) (0.628) (0.995) (0.680) (0.637) 
Expenditure rule -0.1630** -0.0918  -0.1425** 0.0001*  0.0186   0.7817  1.6769** 
 (0.064) (0.145)  (0.067) (0.000)  (1.109)   (1.472)  (0.773) 
Revenue rule -0.2410*   0.1060  -0.7281*** -0.8109**  -0.2016 -0.5557 -0.2789 0.3971 
 (0.143)   (0.201)  (0.190) (0.312)  (0.309) (0.599) (0.381) (0.515) 
Debt rule -0.1491** 0.7387*** 0.3898*** -0.1378 -0.0001 0.3298***  1.4287*** 0.3525 -0.1691 -0.3180  
 (0.070) (0.106) (0.103) (0.098) (0.000) (0.108)  (0.254) (0.527) (0.865) (0.483)  
Observations 363 139 229 273 179 323 248 105 185 168 192 161 
R-squared 0.9823 0.9518 0.9182 0.9822 0.8925 0.9063 0.8134 0.9876 0.9182 0.8179 0.6823 0.9694 
Note: High/Low Debt/Finance/Polity correspond to country averages above/below sample medians for each variable in question. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of parsimony. ***, **, * denote 





Table A4. The determinants of pensions and education spending cyclicality: Robustness (WLS) 
Panel  I – pensions spending cyclicality II- education spending cyclicality 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constraint  High debt Low debt High finance Low finance High polity Low polity High debt Low debt High finance Low finance High polity Low polity 
Credit to GDP (t-1) -0.0012 -0.0825*** 0.0016 -0.0098 -0.0006 -0.1022*** 0.0589*** -0.1492** -0.6039*** -0.0026 0.1465*** -0.1842*** 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.020) (0.020) (0.067) (0.039) (0.036) (0.027) (0.048) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.0494 -0.0732 0.0000 -0.4425** 0.0838 -0.4776** 2.0718*** -0.5884 1.0474*** 0.5588 3.1781*** -0.3235 
 (0.101) (0.234) (0.031) (0.209) (0.094) (0.188) (0.234) (0.606) (0.176) (0.504) (0.325) (0.365) 
Trade openness (t-1) -0.1868*** -0.2630 -0.0820*** -0.2693* -0.0315 -0.1306 -0.8642*** -2.5091*** -0.2919 -1.6720*** -0.8076*** -0.7178** 
 (0.053) (0.230) (0.026) (0.162) (0.061) (0.140) (0.186) (0.639) (0.224) (0.363) (0.273) (0.352) 
Capital account openness (t-1) 0.0169** 0.0723*** -0.0024 0.0483*** 0.0001 0.0377** -0.0054 0.0496 0.0225 -0.1122** -0.0673** -0.0647 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.004) (0.019) (0.008) (0.017) (0.035) (0.057) (0.026) (0.057) (0.033) (0.049) 
Government expenditure to GDP (t-1) 0.0168*** 0.0090 0.0062** 0.0053 -0.0057 0.0277*** -0.0298*** -0.1356*** -0.0167 -0.1032*** -0.0161 -0.1090*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Executive constraints 0.0001 0.0033 -0.0391*** 0.0270 -0.0004 -0.0355 0.0463* -0.0833 -0.0581** 0.1227* 0.1258*** -0.0148 
 (0.013) (0.037) (0.005) (0.027) (0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.090) (0.028) (0.076) (0.046) (0.045) 
Parliamentary regime 0.0572 -0.2516 0.1712*** -0.4196*** -0.4603*** 0.1831 3.3044*** 0.1903 4.3515*** -0.1653 -0.4832** -0.1344 
 (0.205) (0.171) (0.064) (0.152) (0.076) (0.287) (0.341) (0.352) (0.795) (0.398) (0.238) (0.922) 
Presidential election held 0.0074 0.0737 0.0079 0.0570 0.0006 0.1086* -0.1049 0.0960 -0.0183 -0.0599 -0.0602 0.0015 
 (0.028) (0.059) (0.010) (0.051) (0.023) (0.058) (0.089) (0.169) (0.069) (0.175) (0.089) (0.126) 
Legislative election held 0.0045 -0.0916* -0.0076 -0.0315 -0.0137 -0.0416 0.0432 -0.0477 -0.0037 0.1203 0.0421 0.0167 
 (0.018) (0.053) (0.008) (0.038) (0.017) (0.041) (0.059) (0.173) (0.057) (0.139) (0.079) (0.099) 
Proportional representation -0.0387 0.5640** -0.1004*** -0.0559 0.0095 -0.1215 0.4293*** -2.2660 0.5501*** -0.3818 12.6691*** 0.4020** 
 (0.038) (0.236) (0.016) (0.097) (0.040) (0.088) (0.100) (4.199) (0.103) (0.544) (1.413) (0.169) 
Margin of majority -0.0440 -0.4131** 0.0365 -0.2945** -0.0192 -0.3024** -0.0972 0.4892 -0.0374 0.8334* -0.3140 0.2634 
 (0.065) (0.190) (0.028) (0.142) (0.062) (0.140) (0.179) (0.593) (0.170) (0.440) (0.313) (0.258) 
Expenditure rule -0.0239 -0.2187 -0.1737*** -0.1371* -0.0008  0.6238**  -0.3158   -0.0775 
 (0.041) (0.145) (0.045) (0.073) (0.035)  (0.304)  (0.257)   (0.412) 
Revenue rule 0.0049   -0.3424  -0.1572 0.0377 0.3269 0.7373*** -0.0556 -0.4238* 0.4783** 
 (0.173)   (0.318)  (0.252) (0.204) (0.268) (0.122) (0.430) (0.249) (0.195) 
Debt rule -0.1295*** -0.0471 -0.0222* -0.0983 -0.0013 -0.2523***  0.3504 0.6487** 0.1725 0.2296  
 (0.037) (0.096) (0.013) (0.081) (0.034) (0.071)  (0.286) (0.292) (0.310) (0.143)  
Observations 398 212 283 327 279 331 292 165 240 217 173 284 
R-squared 0.9549 0.9714 0.9977 0.9437 0.9038 0.9762 0.9555 0.8374 0.9419 0.9175 0.9668 0.8709 
Note: High/Low Debt/Finance/Polity correspond to country averages above/below sample medians for each variable in question. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
in parentheses. Country and time fixed effects were estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. The constant term was also omitted for reasons of parsimony. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
List of Countries 
 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo Republic, Cote Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Zambia. 
 
 
 
